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CODE NAPOLEON OR CODE PORTALIS1 
.ALAIN LEVASSEUR* 
[On the occasion of the 200th birthday of Napoleo"!, the 
Tulane Law Review presents an important and previously 
untranslated document. The Preliminary Discourse of Port­
alis here trans1ated by Shael Herman, was addressed to the 
Fr�nch National Assembly in 1800, and is perhaps the most 
significant of all the writings preceding the enactment of the 
Co de Napoleon. Its importance is demonstrated by the fol­
lowing article by Professor Levasseur. Its relevance �o. the 
current debate concerning a new Civil Code for Loui�iana 
should be obvious to the readers of the Tulane Law Review.] 
INTRODUCTION 
Tradition and habit would seem to condemn such a question, 
i.e., Code Napoleon or Code Portalis, to an inevitable answer. How­
ever, despite appearance, the answer is not easy to give. Each ele­
ment of the alternative question has merit and weight. On one side 
we have prestige and greatness acquired largely with military 
genius; on the other side we have glory and fame acquired by 
talent of rhetoric, method and compromise. Where Bonaparte, 
the soldier and the military genius, needed officers such as Ney, 
Murat, and Lannes, Bonaparte, the head of state, needed faithful 
and able servants to add laurels to his crown. His greatness lay in 
his wise choices. Justinian had selected Tribonian as the head of the 
commission appointed to write what was to be the Digest; Napoleon 
chose Portalis to fulfill the same obligations. They complemented 
each other very well: one conceived what the other implemented; 
the former would not have had his name attached to the Civil 
Code, had the latter lost his life in the horrors and injustices of 
the Revolution. We feel it is our duty, therefore, to  relate briefly 
the genesis of the Code before it can be shown that the fame and 
fate of the work were due to the exceptional legal mind and 
creative genius of Portalis. 
THE GENESIS OF THE FRENCH CIVIL CODE (OR CODE NAPOLEON) OF 
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been one of the main concerns of the monarchy. The national evolu­
tion, stimulated by good sense and practical reason, seemed to 
suggest the natural tendency towards unification. With the improve­
ments in communications, it  became absurd to pass from the domain 
of one law to that of another every time it was necessary to change 
horses, as Voltaire noticed in a sarcastic remark. Men had come to 
the point where they felt, thought, acted and worked in exactly the 
same way; they came to wish to breathe the same law under the 
same sun, feel the same rules on the same land, live the same social 
and moral principles under the same leadership. Would it be, then, 
a voluminous "coutumier"2 or a modern re-enactment of Roman 
Law? Wishes were expressed, but circumstances would decide. 
They could not decide, however, in any other way than that which 
is inherent in the nature of the Frenchmen and characteristic of the 
French nation: that of elaborating a compromise. The unification 
would be made by a compromise between the "customs" of the 
North and the "written law" of the South, or it would not be! 
. The "grandes ordonnances" of Louis XIV and Louis XV3 paved 
the way, set the example and taught the method. The commissions 
created by Colbert (and often headed by Louis XIV) served as a 
model to those later appointed by Napoleon, and the official tran­
scripts of the former constituted precedents to the latter. The main 
principles of Domat's work4 had been adopted and understood by 
these a rtisans of the first hour, to the point that one can say they 
drafted the grammar of the legislator's art. The first national 
assembly during the Revolution, the Constituent Assembly,11 adopted 
by unanimous vote in September, 1791, the resolution that a Code 
should be drafted. The passage of time caused the promises of the 
Constituent Assembly and the Legislative Assembly6 to be forgotten 
until the Convention appointed a committee and ordered it to draft 
a Civil Code in one month! Cambaceres,7 the president of the com­
mittee, had the impossible task of elaborating a permanent civil 
code in sympathy with the views of the constantly changing majority 
of the assemblies, whether under the Convention or the Directory. 
2 An accumulation of the usages, customs and mores of a territory. 
a These ordonnances were often referred to as "Codes." See, e.g., Ordon­
nance of 1667 on civil procedure (familiarly known as the Code Louis) i 
Ordonnance of 1670 on criminal procedure (called Criminal Code); Ordonnance 
of 1673 o n  commerce (often called Code Savary). 
4 J. Domat, Les lois civiles dans leur ordre nature! (1690-1697). 
5 The Constituent Assembly governed from June 17, 1789, to September 
30, 1791. 
6 The Legislative Assembly governed from September 30, 1791, to Sep­
tember 21, 1792. 
7 Cambaceres (1753-1824) wrote three projets of civil code; the first in 
1793, the second in 1794, the third in 1798. 
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At the end of 1799, the French people still expected, but
 with in­
creasing impatience, the Code always promised and always def
 erred. 
It is then that a single man stood, ambitious and conqueri
i:i
g, 
against the destructive forces of the dying R�v�lution, to r
e�1ve 
the spirit and the glow of the first days. Procla1mmg the Const�tu
­
tion of the Consulate, on the 15th day of December, 1799, the First 
Consul told the Nation: "the Constitution is based on the sacred 
rights of property, equality and liberty .... Citizens, the �evol�­
tion is stabilized according to the principles that started it. It is 
finished." Napoleon's genius was that he interpreted the feeling 
of the greatest majority of the French people and his glory was 
that, having made a promise, he fulfilled it completely. The legend 
was born, then, that the whole civil code came out of Napoleon's 
mind, following the mythological image of Minerva's birth out of 
Jupiter's brain. This legend is really but a legend. A careful analysis 
of the law laid down in the code, a glance back on the history of 
its drafting, show very plainly that almost all of its content had 
been inherited from the past (pre-revolutionary French law) or 
received from the previous eve (law of the Revolution). Napoleon's 
merit was to learn the art of making a law as he learned the art 
of fighting a war: by practising them. The First Consul presided 
over the meetings of the Council of State ( Conseil d'Etat) , as 
General Bonaparte commanded his army on the battlefield: he 
could see the victory, he could evaluate his means, and he could 
adapt the latter to achieve the former. The means at his disposal 
consisted in a handful of prominent jurists, scions of the noble 
traditions of the French Parliaments.s On August 13, 1800, the 
First Consul appointed a commission of four members to prepare 
the draft of a new civil code. The members of the commission, these 
artisans of the last hour, these faithful workers of a tremendous 
monument, labored constantly under the supervision of Bonaparte, 
w
�ose intelligence insatiable of preciseness, whose genius imbued 
with realism, forced them to create a code commensurate with the 
glory of an Emperor. Napoleon, while in exile would then be en­
titled to say : "My true glory is not that I h�ve won 40 battles; 
Waterloo will blow away the memory of these victories. What 
nothing can blow away, what will live eternally, is m y  Civil Code." 
The members of the commission never claimed they intended to 
act as. creators; they were disciples but not prophets, jurists but 
not witch-lawyers! The First Consul of the Republic appointed 
T
�onchet� who was then President of the Tribunal of Cassation; B1got-Preameneu, government commissioner in that Tribunal· Mal­
leville, a judge at the Tribunal of Cassation; and Portalis, g�vern-
. 8 These Parliam�nts, under the monarchy, had judicial functions political rights, nnd also a wide power of administration. 
' 
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ment commissioner in the Prize Council.9 The wisdom, the 
experience, and the scholarship of these men led them to understand 
that their historical responsibility was to operate a smooth transi­
tion between the present and the past, so that the Civil Code would 
remai n  for the people the French Revolution organized. 
PORT ALIS 
Among all of the jurists who contributed to the drafting of the 
Code, Portalis played the leading role. He was of those men whom 
history made great because they were humble and modest, qualities 
tha t human memory forgets easily where it can grasp others more 
readily. Portalis can be compared to these prominent figures of 
antique Rome whose names Cicero has immortalized, the Publius 
Scaevola, the Quintus Mucius . . . 10 
Portalis was born in 1746,11 of a father who was a professor of 
canon law at the University of Aix-en-Provence. While in college at 
the Oratorians, he exhibited an unusual ability to speak in public 
and a precocious maturity of judgment. At the age of 19, he became 
a lawyer at the Parliament of Aix, where his method of pleading 
practically revolutionized court procedure. Thibaudeau12 tells us 
that after his first pleading, an old colleague of his went to him and 
sa id, "You have pleaded with great effectiveness; but you must 
change your method which is not that of the bar." "Sir," Portalis 
proudly answered, "it is the method of the bar that needs to be 
changed, not me." 
I n  1770, although Portalis was only 24, the Prime Minister, the 
Duke of Choiseul, asked him for a "consultation sur la validite des 
mariages des Protestants." This consultation had such an impact on 
the ideas of the time that Voltaire could write that it "was not a 
consultation but a real treatise of philosophy, legislation and 
political morals."13 In two subsequent works14 he expressed ideas 
and thoughts opposed to the necessity for uniform laws, uniformity 
of legislation being one of the main instruments leading towards 
despotism. For several years he would raise strong doubts about the 
o 1 P. Fenet, Recueil complet des travaux prepnratoires du Code civil lzii 
(1827). 
10 Publius Scaevola is mentioned in Cicero's Digest. Quintus Mucius is 
mentioned in Cicero's De Oratore, De amicitia, De Republica. 
11 At Bausset, near Toulon. 12 Thibaudeau Memoires sur le Consulat par un ancien conseiller d'etat 
de 1799 a 1804 at 414 (See Capitant, Portalis, le Pere du Code Civi� 66 Rev. 
crit. leg. jur. 187, 189 n.1 (1936). . . . . . 1a Discours, rapports et travaux med1ts sur le C�e C1v1l, published by 
the Vicomte Frederic Portalis ( Portalis' grandson) Parts 1845. 
u "Lettre des Avocats d u  Parlement de Provence au Garde des Sceaux" 
(1788); "Examen impartial des nouveaux Edits" (1788). 
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feasibility of a code. He could not foresee then the strong a�d 
heroic hand, the all-powerful sword under which he would work in 
peace during the Consulate, at the head of the group of the Elders. 
During the horrible year s  of the French Revolution he was sent 
to prison and might have been sentenced to death had not his son 
managed to save him. Elected to the Conseil des Anciens under the 
Directory, Bonaparte noticed him and later Napoleon appointed 
him, in April 1800, commissioner in the Prize Council and a few 
months later Conseiller d'Etat (member of the Council of State)· 
At the time of this last appointment, Portalis was already completely 
blind. A cataract had woven its black veil over his eyes. The loss of 
his sight in no way affected the intellectual qualities of the man. 
His wonderful memory15 served him as a substitute for sight, and 
France would owe to a blind man one of the greatest of her con­
tributions to the world: the Civil Code. When one reads Portalis 
one cannot but be stricken b y  his method, by his style, quite similar 
to the traditions of the rhetoricians of Antiquity.16 His memory is 
filled with maxims, definitions and precepts of moral science and 
political science. "He [Montesquieu] taught us not to separate de­
tails from the whole, he taught us to study the laws in history, 
which is like the applied physics of the legislative science."17 Good 
faith and common sense are the two most important philosophical 
features of Portalis' personality; he was definitely the most learned, 
the wisest and the deepest of the members of the Commission. 
Educated and brought up in the South of France, versed in the 
knowledge of Roman Law, taught to respect the written law, 
Portalis wanted very much for the Roman tradition to be adopted, 
but his wisdom and his belief in the greatness of his responsibility 
led him, quite naturally, to work towards a compromise with 
Tronchet, the def ender of customary law of northern France. 
Portalis' leading role in the drafting of the French Civil Code 
was acknowledged by his colleagues in the Commission who en­
tru�ted him with the task of writing the general report on the works 
achiev�d by the Commission, to bring to light the spirit that inspired 
a�d g�ided the drafters. His previous works, his philosophical mind, 
his wide knowledge, everything marked him out for this task. He 
called,,1
�is �eport
. 
"�relimi�ary discourse on the projet of Civil 
Code.. This prehmmary discourse is a masterpiece of legal science 
and rightfully considered as such. 
�: �ee �:in
t
te-Be
1
uv�, Portalis, 5 Causeries du lundi 441 et seq. (1852). 17 
S
ee 
S 
� rans ation of the Preliminary Discourse, infra. ee ainte-Beuve, supra note 15 a t  462 18 c •ta t p . , . 
( 1936). 
api n 
' ortalis, le Pere du Code Civil, 56 Rev. cri t. leg. jur. 187 
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PRELIMINARY DISCOURSE19 
NATURE OF THE LA w20 
767 
Good civil legislation is the greatest asset that men can give and 
receive; it is the source o f  morals, the safeguard of property, and 
the guarantor of peace, both public and private; while it does not 
establish the government, it maintains it; it restrains power and 
contributes to its respect, as if the power were justice itself. Every 
person is affected by legislation, for it intertw ines with the prin­
cipal activities of his life, and follows him everywhere; it often 
constitutes the only morality of a nation and is always connected 
with its freedom; finally, it comforts every citizen for sacrifices 
that political necessity requires him to make for the community by 
protecting him when necessary in both his person and property, as 
if he alone were the entire community. 
. . . But what a task it is to draft civil legislation for a great 
people! The work would exceed human strength, if it involved giv­
ing this people an absolutely new institution, and if, forgetting it  
occupies the highest rank among civilized nations, we chose to 
ignore the experience o f  the past and the t radition of common 
sense, rules, and maxims which has come down to us and embodies 
the s pirit of centuries. 
Legislation is not a pure act of power; it is an act of wisdom, 
justice, and reason. The legislator does not exercise authority as 
much as he serves a sacred office. He must not forget that legisla­
tion is made for men, and that men are not made for legislation ; 
that it should be adapted to the character, habits, and position o f  
the people for whom it is made; that caution about novelty in 
legislative matters is necessary because, while it is possible in a new 
undertaking to calculate the advantages a theory offers, it is im ­
possible to anticipate all the drawbacks that practice alone can 
reveal; that one must leave what is good alone if one is in doubt 
about what is better; tha t  in correcting an abuse, the dangers in­
herent in the correction itself must be reckoned with; that it would 
be absurd to surrender oneself to a belief in absolute perfection in 
matters susceptible of only relative goodness; that instead of chang­
ing the laws, it is almost always more useful to give the citizens new 
10 Translated by M. Shael Herman. 
20 The headings do not appear in the original text. Because we hnvc trnns­
latcd only excerpts from the speech, thr hcndings hnve been nddcd to guide 
the reader's attention. 
Several short selections from this Discourse have previously appeared. S1�. 
e.g., A. Von Mehren, The Civil Law System 57.59 (1957). 
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grounds for liking them ; that history offers us the promulgation of 
scarcely more than two or three good laws in the space of several 
centuries; that finally, it is proper to propose char:ges only to. 
those 
whose destiny it is to grasp, by a stroke of genius and a kind of 
sudden insight, the whole organization of a state.21 
THE DYNAMISM OF THE LAW 
... At the beginning of our discussions, we could not help be�n� 
surprised by the opinion, so widely held, that in drafting a c1v1l 
code, a few precise provisions on each subject would suffice and 
that the great art is to simplify everything while foreseeing every-
thing. 
To simplify everything is an undertaking on the meaning of 
which we would all have to agree. To anticipate everything is a 
goal impossible of attainment. 
There must be no useless laws; they would weaken those which 
are necessary and compromise the certainty and majesty of the 
legislation . 
. . . The laws of the Twelve Tables are constantly proposed as 
models; but can we compare the institutions of a nation just being 
born with those of a nation that has already reached the pinnacle of 
wealth and civilization? Didn't Rome, born to greatness and des­
tined, so to speak, to be the eternal city, quickly recognize the 
insufficiency of her original laws? Didn't the changes which had 
gradually taken place in her mores provoke a c hange in her legisla­
tion'? ... The history of Roman legal development is very much 
that of all nations. 
In despotic states, where the prince owns all the land, where all 
commerce is carried on in the name of the head of state and for his 
benefit, where individuals have neither liberty, nor free will, nor 
property, there are more judges and hangmen than there are laws; 
but wherever citizens have property to preserve and defend, 
wherever they have political and civil rights, wherever honor counts 
for something, a proper number of laws are needed to encompass 
everything. The various kinds of goods, the various kinds of in­
dustry, the various predicaments of human Iif e demand different 
rules. The concern of the lawmaker must be divided in proportion 
to the multiplicity and importance of the matters which require 
legislation. As a consequence, we find in the codes of civilized na-
21 This passage is believed to be a flattering reference to Napoleon. See 
A. Esme in, 1 L'Originalite du Code Civil 6 (1904). 
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tions the kind of meticulous attention which covers a multiplicity 
of particular issues and seems to make an art of reason itself. 
Thus, we did not think we should simplify the laws to the 
point of leaving citizens without rule or guarantee concerning their 
greatest interests. 
We also kept clear of the dangerous ambition of wanting to 
forecast and regulate everything. Who would imagine that those to 
whom a code always seems too voluminous are the very people who 
dare imperiously to assign the lawmaker the arduous task of leaving 
nothing to the discretion of the judge? 
No matter what we do, positive laws could never entirely replace 
the use of natural reason in the affairs of life. Society's needs are 
so varied, the intercourse between men so active, their interests so 
manifold, and their relations so extensive that the legislator cannot 
possibly provide for all eventualities. 
In the very matters that particularly call for his attention, 
there is a host of details which either escape him or are too much 
open to contention or instability to become the subject of a legal 
provision. 
In any case, how can one fetter the movement of time? How can 
one resist the course of events or the steady pressure of customs? 
How can one know and calculate in advance what only experience 
can r eveal? Can a forecast ever encompass matters that thought 
cannot reach? 
A code, however complete it may seem, is hardly finished before 
a thousand unexpected issues come to face the judge. For laws, 
once drafted, remain as they were written. Men, on the contrary, 
are never at rest; they are constantly active, and their unceasing 
activities, the effects of which are modified in many ways by cir­
cumstances, produce at e ach instant some new combination, some 
new fact, some new result. 
A host of things is thus necessarily left to the province of cus­
tom, the discussion of learned men, and the decision of judges. 
The role of legislation is to set, by taking a broad approach. the 
general propositions of the law, to establish principles which will be 
fertile in application, and not to get down to the details of questions 
which may arise in particular instances. 
It is for the judge and the jurist, imbued with the general spirit 
of the laws, to direct their application. 
Hence, in all civilized nations, we always witness the formation, 
770 TULANE LAW REVIEW [Vol. XLIII
 
alongside the temple of enacted laws and under the legisla
t?r's 
supervision of a repository of maxims, decisions, and doctr
m�l 
writings w'hich is daily refined by the practitioners and t�e1
r 
clashing debates in court, which steadily grows as all acquired 
knowledge is added to it, and which has always been regarded as 
the true supplement of legislation. 
We reproach those who expound jurisprudence for having multi­
plied subtleties, compilations, and commentaries. This reproach 
may have merit. But in what art or science is one not exposed t o  
such a reproach? Should w e  accuse a particular class of men o f  
something which is only a general disease of the human mind? 
There are times when we are condemned to ignorance because we 
lack books; there are others when it is hard to learn because we 
have too many of them . 
. . . Undoubtedly, it would be desirable that all matters be regu­
lated by legislation. 
But if there is no precise provision on a particular matter, then 
an ancient custom, constant and well established, an unbroken line 
of similar decisions, an opinion, or an accepted maxim takes the 
place of enacted law. When we are guided by nothing which is 
established or known, when what is involved is an absolutely new 
occurrence, we go back to principles of natural law. For if the law­
maker's foresight is limited, nature is infinite; she applies to all 
things that concern men. 
All this presumes compilations, collections, treatises, and nu­
merous volumes of research and analysis. 
Some say the people, trapped in this labyrinth, cannot discern 
what they must avoid or what they must do t o  attain security for 
their possessions and rights. 
But would even the simplest code be within the grasp of all 
classes of society? Wouldn't passions constantly be busying them­
selves with distorting its true meaning? Is not a certain amount of 
experie!1ce ne�ded wisely to apply the laws? In any event, where is  
the nation which has found a small number of simple laws sufficient 
for very long? 
It would thus be erroneous to think that there could be a body of 
laws that would provide in advance for all possible c·ases and yet at 
the same time would be within the grasp of the humblest citizen. 
In the present state of our societies, it is very fortunate that 
the study of case law is a science that attracts talent, enhances 
self-respect, and awakens emulation. A whole class of men then 
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dedicates itself to this science; and this class, devoted to the study of 
the laws, supplies advice and defenders to citizens unable to manage 
their affairs or to def end themselves, and becomes like a seminary 
for the judiciary. 
It is very fortunate that we have compendia, and a constant 
tradition of customs, maxims and rules so that i t  becomes necessary, 
in some way, to judge today much as we judged yesterday, and that 
there be no variations between judicial decisions other than those 
resulting from the progress of enlightenment and the force of cir­
cumstances. 
It is very fortunate that the judge's need to learn, to do re­
search, and closely to examine the questions presented to him neve r  
permits him to forget that, while there are things within his dis­
cretion, there are none which are entirely up to his caprice or whim. 
In Turkey, where deciding cases is not art at all, where the 
pasha can decide as he wishes whenever higher orders are not in his 
way, we see the parties ask and receive justice only in fear. Why 
don't we have the same anxieties before our judges? It is because 
they are well-versed in their craft, are enlightened and learned, and 
believe themselves under a constant duty to rely upon the enlighten­
ment and learning of others. One can hardly r ealize how much this 
scientific and rational practice mitigates and controls power. 
METHOD OF INTERPRETATION 
. . . There are two types of interpretation: one by way of doc­
trinal theory, and the other by way of authority. 
Interpretation by way of doctrine consists in grasping the true 
sense of the laws, applying them in a discerning fashion, and sup­
plementing them in those cases which the laws have not provided 
for. Without this kind of interpretation could we think of fulfilling 
the judge's function? 
Interpretation by way of authority consists in resolving ques­
tions and doubts by means of regulations (reglemens) or general 
dispositions (dispositions generales) •22 This last means of inter­
pretation is the only one forbidden to the judge. 
When the legislation is clear, it must be followed; when it is 
obscure, we must carefully analyze its provisions. If there is no par­
ticular enactment, custom or equity must be consulted. Equity is the 
return to natural law, when positive laws are silent, contradictory, 
or obscure. 
22 Reglements are rules having a limited scope and application. Dispositions 
generales are governmental bills of broad scope and ap plication. [Translator's 
foot note.] 
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... Parties who deal with each other on a subject not regulate? 
by positive law submit themselves to received customs, or to uni­
versal principles of equity in the absence of any cus�oms. No�, to 
make a finding on a point of custom and then apply it to a private 
dispute is a judicial act, not a legislative one. The application of 
this equity or case-by-case justice which considers and must con­
sider, in each particular case, all the little threads which. bind one 
litigant to the other can never be in the legislator's domam, for he 
is uniquely the minister of this justice or general equity, that with­
out regard to any particular circumstance, e mbraces the univer­
sality of persons and things. Legislation that intervened in private 
affairs would then often be suspected of resulting from partiality; 
it would always be retroactive and unjust for those whose lawsuits 
were instituted before its enactment. 
Besides, recourse to the legislator would involve fatal delays to 
the parties; and, what is worse, it would jeopardize the wisdom and 
sanctity of the legislation. 
In effect, legislation governs everyone; it  considers men en 
masse, never as individuals; it must not interfere in individual 
matters or lawsuits where citizens are pitted against one another. 
Were the situation otherwise, it would be necessary to enact new 
laws daily; their number would stunt their dignity and hinder their 
observance. Magistrates would lose their function, and the law­
maker, fettered by details, would soon be nothing more than a 
magistrate. Individual interests would besiege legislative power; 
at each instant, they would divert its attention from society's gen­
ral interests. 
There is a science for lawmakers, as there is for judges; and 
the former does not resemble the latter. The legislator's science 
consists in finding in each subject the principles most favorable to  
the common good; the judge's science is to put these principles into 
effect, to diversify them, and to extend them, by means of wise and 
reasoned application, to private causes· to examine closely the 
spirit
. 
of the la� when the letter kills ; and not to  expose himself to 
the risk of bemg alternately slave and rebel, and of disobeying 
because of a servile mentality. 
. The legislator must pay attention to case law; it can enlighten him, and he can �orrect it; but there must be a body of case law. 
In �he �ost of subJects that make up civil matters, the judgments of 
�h1ch, m most c�ses,. require less an application of a precise provi­
sion than a combm.a�ion ?f several provisions leading to the decision 
rather than contammg it, one cannot dispense with case law any 
more than he can dispense with legislation. It is to judicial decision 
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that we surrender the rare and extraordinary cases incapable of 
fitting into a mold of rational legislation, the details so varied and 
so much disputed that they should not concern the lawmaker at all, 
and all the issues that one would try vainly to anticipate or that 
a hasty prediction could not safely provide for. It is for experience 
gradually to fill up the gaps we leave. The Codes of nations are the 
fruit of the passage of time; but properly speaking, we do not 
make them. 
NATURAL LAW AND POSITIVE LAW 
Law (Droit) is universal reason, supreme reason based upon 
the very nature of things. Legislation (lois) is o r  should be no more 
than law reduced to positive rules and individual precepts. Law is 
morally obligatory; but by itself, it does not involve any constraints; 
law guides, legislation commands; law serves as a navigator's 
compass, and legislation as a geometer's compass.23 
Nations live among themselves only beneath the authority of 
law. Members of each community are ruled as men by law, and, as 
citizens, by legislation. 
Natural law and the law of nations (ius gentium) do not differ 
in terms of substance, only in terms of their application. Reason, 
insofar as it governs all men, is called natural l aw, and this reason 
is called the law of nations (ius gentium) when applied to relations 
of one people with another. 
When we speak of a natural law of nations and a positive law of 
nations, it is to distinguish eternal principles of justice, which 
nations have not created but which dominate them like the humblest 
of men, from conventions, treaties, and customs that are the work 
of nations. 
. . . We have determined the various effects of legislation. It 
permits or defends; it orders, establishes, corrects, punishes or 
rewards. It obliges without distinction all those living under its 
sway; even foreigners, during their residence, are the temporary 
subjects of the laws of the State. To inhabit its territory is to sub­
mit to its sovereignty. 
Whatever is not contrary to legislation is licit. But whatever 
conforms to it is not always morally honest; for legislation is more 
concerned with society's political welfare than with men's moral 
perfection. 
2a Portalis' metaphor suggests that law (droit) points the directions that 
moral behavior should take. Legislation (les lois) defines the limits of conduct 
which society permits or demands. 
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... Judicial power, established to apply the laws, needs to be 
guided in this application by certain rules. We have defined them: 
laws are such that a man's private reason cannot prevail over the 
law, which is public reason. 
CONCLUSION 
"I was correct in designating Portalis as the father of the civil 
Code."2' Invested with the confidence and esteem of Napoleon, 
Portalis died in August 1807 at the age of 61. ·The Empire was 
then at the peak of its glory and spared one of its most outstanding 
servants the pains and sufferings of the mistakes and disasters of 
the second half of its existence. The spiritual father of the Civil 
Code had deserved well of France and the w orld. 
2• Capitant, Portalis, le Pere du Code Civil 56 Rev crit leg J0ur 187, 199 (1936). • . . . • 
